The Municipal Court judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion. Whether to grant a motion for a bill of particulars is left to the discretion of the judge. and the effect, when filed, is to bind and restrict the Commonwealth as to the scope of the indictment and to the proof to be offered in support of it" (citations omitted). is to give a defendant reasonable knowledge of the nature and character of the crime charged. of specifications in a bill of particulars. There was no error or abuse of discretion.ġ. 211, Section 3, unless the single justice abused his or her discretion or made a clear error of law. This court will not reverse a single justice's denial of a petition brought pursuant to G.
The single justice denied the petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration, and the defendant filed this appeal. 211, Section 3, to reverse the denial of his motion for a bill of particulars and his motion to dismiss. The defendant petitioned a single justice in the county court, pursuant to G. Seven months later, he was arrested on the warrant, the default was removed, and a trial was rescheduled.
The defendant failed to appear at his scheduled trial in the jury session a default warrant issued. He also argued that a trial in the jury session would subject him to being placed twice in jeopardy in violation of the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Constitution. The complaint and the bill of particulars in violation of Mass. The defendant then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the verdict from the bench trial amounted to an improper amendment of The motion judge denied his motion but ruled that the Commonwealth would be limited at the jury trial to the evidence it had introduced at the bench trial. In the jury session, the defendant moved for a second bill of particulars, asking that the Commonwealth specifically identify the misdemeanor he allegedly intended to commit. Dissatisfied with this result, he appealed to the jury session of the Boston Municipal Court for a trial de novo. The defendant waived his right to an initial jury trial, and, after a bench trial, was found guilty of so much of the complaint as charged him with breaking and entering in the day time with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth amended the complaint to charge the defendant with breaking and entering in the day time with the intent to commit a felony. The Commonwealth's response included a statement that larceny was the felony that the defendant intended to commit when he broke and entered the tenant's home. Prior to the bench trial, the defendant moved for a bill of particulars pursuant to Mass. The defendant owned an apartment building in Boston and, after a dispute with a tenant over the terms of the tenancy, allegedly entered the tenant's apartment, removed the front door from its hinges, and removed most of the tenant's possessions, nearly all of which were later returned. The defendant originally was charged in the Boston Municipal Court with breaking and entering in the night time with the intent to commit a felony. We affirm the judgment of the single justice. The defendant sought relief from the denial by a judge of the Boston Municipal Court of the defendant's second pretrial motion for a bill of Sherman Rogan (defendant) appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying him relief under G. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. ĬIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 9, 1992. Greater offense of which he was implicitly acquitted. The defendant's motion in the jury session for a bill of particulars did not infringe his right not to be placed again in jeopardy for the Where a defendant at a Boston Municipal Court bench trial was convicted of a lesser offense included within the offense charged in the complaint,Īnd thereafter claimed a de novo trial in the jury session, the de novo trial was to be limited to the lesser included offense thus denial of 211 Section 3, did not abuse his discretion in declining to set aside Second bill of particulars where, not only had the defendant been apprised of the nature and character of the crime charged, but inĪddition the judge had limited the evidence to be introduced at the trial de novo to that which was introduced at the bench trial Īccordingly, a single justice of this court, in a proceeding under G. The judge at a jury session of the Boston Municipal Court did not abuse his discretion in denying a criminal defendant's pretrial motion for a 376 FebruJSuffolk County Present: LIACOS, C.J., ABRAMS, NOLAN, O'CONNOR, & GREANEY, JJ.